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ducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits
and protections of its laws." "
Hence, the position taken that there is a needless distinction
drawn between tort and tortious act in the instant cases does
open the door to the further problem of drawing the line between
the situations where CPLR 302 (a) (2) can be constitutionally applied and those wherein its application would be unconstitutional.
The fact that such a problem would face the courts, however,
should not act as a deterrent to proper construction of the statute,
but rather, should serve as a stimulus towards meeting the problem
created when combining the due process requirements of "minimum
contacts" with the expanded jurisdictional bases now being
utilized.
CPLR 302(a)(3): Ownership, use or possession of real property.
Tebedo V. Nye,75 one of the infrequent decisions construing
CPLR 302 (a) (3), involved a cause of action for failure to convey
real property. Defendant Nye, after agreeing to sell the disputed
land to the plaintiffs and accepting the consideration, conveyed the
entire parcel to defendant McLaughlin. McLaughlin, allegedly
with knowledge of a prior agreement to convey to the plaintiffs,
conveyed the realty to a third party. Subsequently, McLaughlin
established residence in Florida where he was served personally
under CPLR 302 (a) (3). The court held that irrespective of the
fact that the defendant McLaughlin no longer had any interest
in the land, nor owned any other real estate in New York, jurisdiction would nonetheless be sustained on the basis of "the
relationship existing between the defendant and the realty out of
cause of action arose at the time the cause of action
which the
76
arose."
CPLR 305(b):

Amendment.

CPLR 305(b), as originally enacted, provided that for purposes
of a default judgment it would not be necessary to serve a
complaint with the summons if (1) the claim was for a sum
certain, and (2) a notice stating this sum was served with the
summons. The CPLR 305(b) notice would take the place of the
complaint for default purposes. In 1965, this was amended to
provide for the expanded use of such notice, i.e., a statement of
the nature of the action and the relief demanded in monetary
as well as non-monetary actions. There is some disagreement as
74 Ibid.
Misc. 2d 222, 256 N.Y.S.2d 235
1965).
76 Id. at 223, 256 N.Y.S.2d at 236.
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to the scope of the statutory language,"7 although it is agreed
that the legislature did intend the notice to be available in any
action.T"
CPLR 308(3):

Substituted service.

In Huntington Utilities Fuel Corp. v. McLoughlin,7 9 an action
to impose a trust on lands allegedly purchased with money taken
from the plaintiffs, defendants moved to dismiss on the ground
of insufficient service. They contended that substituted service
was not available where the number of times that plaintiffs attempted
personal service did not amount to "due diligence." 80 In refusing
to set aside service, the court held that it would not adjudicate
the question of "due diligence" where the parties disagree simply
about the number of attempts at personal service which must be
shown to permit the employment of substituted service.
The number of attempts necessary to constitute "due diligence"
is not subject to exact determination. However, it is quite possible
to foresee situations in which twenty or even thirty attempts would
be insufficient."' Thus, the facts of each case must be examined
to determine whether under the particular circumstances "due diligence" was employed, so as to permit substituted service.
In Polansky v. Paugh,8 2 plaintiff knew that defendant had
left his last known residence prior to attempted substituted service.
The court, in a per curiam opinion, held that substituted service
by mail was violative of due process where it appeared that prior
to mailing the defendant did not reside at the stated address.
It is submitted that the court's statement should not be
accepted by the practitioner as a general principle. In the enactment of CPLR 308(3), the legislature has chosen to afford a
defendant greater protection 8 than that required by federal due
77 Compare 7B McKrm.NY's CPLR 305, supp. commentary 74 (1965),
with 7B McKINNE,'s CPLR 3215, supp. commentary 155 (1965).
78 1965 JUDICIAL CONTERENC REPORT, McKINrEY'S SESSiOx LAW NEWS
A80.
7945 Misc. 2d 79, 255 N.Y.S.2d 679 (Sup. Ct Suffolk County 1965).
80 See FIFTH REP. 266, wherein it is stated that the "due diligence" required by CPLR 308(3) is based upon "present requirements," i.e., as
required by the CPA. In this regard see Gurland v. D'Erbstein, 106 N.Y.S.2d
210 (Sup. Ct. 1951), wherein it was stated that substituted service is in
derogation of the common-law rule that process must be personally served
within the court's jurisdiction, and hence, directions pertaining to substituted
service must be strictly construed and fully carried out. Id. at 211.
81 E.g., X attempts personal service by delivery at Y'.Ts home each day
at the same time for thirty weekdays. Each time this "attempt" is made,
the plaintiff knows that the defendant will not be at home but will be at
work in another city.
8223 App. Div. 2d 643, 256 N.Y.S2d 961 (1st Dep't 1965).
83
Firn-rREP. 266.

